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URING the past decade, computer-based expert systems have emerged to become the most applied facet of artificial intelligence (AI). To date, expert systems have proven to be particularly effective in &$emm~c tasks, eg antimicrobial selection and interpretation of geological data (Duda and Shortliffe 1151) . Such "domains of expertise" are typically characterized by uncertain field data, subjective expert opinions, and inexact decision rules. n e challenge of dealing with these uncertainties has stirred o lively debate among developers of expert systems on the one hand, and faithful followers of the Bayesiari religion on the other. First, the drive to experiment with real expert systems has led A1 researchers to implement a d h uncertainty mechanisms that are rather limited on normative grounds. This, in turn, has drawn criticism from Bayesian writers who, nonetheless, were forced to admit that the classical methods they preached did not always scale up to realistic applications. As the reference section of this paper indicates, the result was an inspiring exchange of ideas that is currently going strong in many academic circles in computer science, statistics, and psychology.
Manuscript received August 29, 1988; revised January 29, 1989 Just like any other formal model, an expert system imposes a rigid structure on the problem it attempts to support. In particular, rule-based systems make the assumption that expertise can be captured through a moduk a Sei B of hderm~~: rules. These rules are supposed to "objective" howledge as well as subjective expert opinions. To illustrate, consider the following familiar problem.
A tenured professor (hereafter referred to as a "recruiter'') attempts to guess the academic potential of a candidate to a junior faculty position. The information available to the recruiter is the typical mix of resume, papers, and recommendaiion letters, along with his own pa% recruiting exweace. The review process is complicated by the fact that many young Ph.D.'s are competing for the same slot; therefore, the god of the nxruiter is to rank-order the candidates in terms of their prospective academic potential. The overall criterion for academic success is taken to be the perceived likelihood of the prowtion, "the candidate will be offered a tenured position in our department within the next decade."
A recruiter is said to be an "expert" if his predictions consistentIy exhibit a great deal of external validity. To make an extreme case, let us assume that our recruiter is a perfect predictor: all the candidates that he has recommended In the past were subsequently offered tenure, and all the people that he has rejected were refused tenure in similar departments. F~rthennore, our expert is willing to describe his proven recruiting rationale in terms of a set of inference rules. These rules represent, in his mind, the perceived academic significance of various credentials. Given this and other relevant information, is there a plausible model that can credibly synthesize this rule-base into a belief about the academic potential of a particular candidate? Can this model be further implemented in a computer-based system designed to carry out routine screening of candidates? These questions must be addressed by developers and users of rule-based expert systems.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the credentials of prospective candidates can be enumerated through a finite set of dichotomous propositions {e,; -, e n ) . For example, e, might say that the candidate has an undergraduate degree in mathematics, and e, that he has extensive consulting experience. In a rule-based system, these clues are related to various hypotheses through a set of 0018-9472/89/0900-1106$01.00 01989 
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rules, elicited from a recruiting expert. For example, our recruiter might suggest that, more often than not, a math degree e improves tenure prospects h. This inexact implication might be represented as I if e then h with degree of belief be1 ( h , ( e ) ) .
The meaning of the quantitative degree of belief bel(h, { e)) in this logical context is an open question, tracing back to Carnap's work on inductive logic [7] . It is tempting to give these degrees of belief a probabilistic interpretation; nonetheless, scores of writers have demonstrated that logic and probability do not mix very well. This difficulty, combined with the presswe to develop rule-based s p i m s that can handle uncertainty, has led to a proliferation of incompatible quasi-probabilistic belief ha
In this paper we review and analyze these languages % H m a Bayesian perspective. Our genera4 qptoacfm is as fa@om: given a particular belief languqe, we wish to address three questions, related to the syntax, calculus, and semantics,
I
respectively, of the underlying language. 1) What is the Bayesian interpretation of the number bel(h, {e))?
2) Given a set of degrees of belief bel(h, {elf), -. , be1 ( h , {e,j) aed a belief eonabinatioa mIe C(bel(h, {e,J);..,bel(h, {e,))), what is the Bayesian interpretation of this rule? 3) Do the answers to 1) and 2) place any constrains on the scope of inference problems that rule-based systems can credibly wive?
It goes without saying that proper knowledge engineering requires that degrees of belief be elicited, computed, and interpreted in a credible manner. Beside the normative sigruficance of this objective, degrees of belief should be handled cautiously since the plausibility of tbe final set of hypotheses generated by an expefi system is iypkdy a function of the algebraic ranking of their posterior degrees of belief. For example, the diae0fi.s program internist (Pople [43] ) uses the disease with the highest ranking degree of belief as an anchor, around which a fuzzy subset of plausible hypotheses is defined. Thus, both the external as well as the internal validity of an expert system are directly related to the validity of its underlying belief language.
Nonetheless, it seems by now that no single belief language exists that will be effective, efficient, and plausible for all possible applications and, at the same time, satisfy all knowledge engineers, experts, users, and researchers. This realization has led to a proliferation of new belief languages in the last decade. At the foundation of any of these languages lies either a descriptive or a normative argument about human judgement under uncertainty. A descriptive language attempts to capture the way experts actually reason; hence its measure of performance is its capability of simulating human judgment. In contrast, a normative model is based on the premise that human reasoning under uncertainty is often suboptimal; rather than attempting to replicate it blindly, the normative approach is more concerned with the proximity of the system's judgment to such rigorous standards as logic or probability theory. It is well-known by now that normative models are not necessarily consistent with descriptive models, as has been demonstrated by numerous studies in cognitive psychology and in decision sciences. For a good discussion of this dichotomy, the reader is referred to Baron [4] .
The classical method for representing and updating degrees of belief is the Bayesian language, which is consistent with the axioms of subjective probability. Researchers who attempted to implement this method in expert systems, however, were quick to discover three major limitations: a) standard manipulations of discrete joint distribution f m d o n s are coqutationaIIy complex (Pearl [a]); b) the Bayesian lanmge does not lend itself easily to reprm* ambiguity and fuzzy expert opinions (Shafer [50] )'; and c) human reasoning under uncertainty is systematically inconsistent with Bayesian inference (Tversky and Kahneman [57] ).
Efforts to curb the inherent limitations of a complete Bayesian design have taken several directions. Early expert systems such as MYCIN (Shortliffe [53] ) and Prospector (b& et al. [14] ) employed ad hoe belief languages based on certainty factors and subjective likelihood ratios, respectively. The resulting belief-update mechanisms were only partially consistent with the axioms of subjective probability. These "first generation" systems gave way to a renewed interest in probability theory, led by Howard's [28] work on influence diagrams and Pearl's [40] belief networks. Pearl's methods of propagating probabilities through a network of propositions are consistent with standard probability theory. In the case of singly connected networks, the run-the of Pearl's algorithm is polinomial with the siaR of the network. The problem of probabilistic belief-update in a general network has been shown to be NP-hard (Copper [Ill) .
Perhaps the most important development in the quest to "extend" the Bayesian language is Shafer's work on belief functions and the corresponding Dempster rule for combining them (Shafer [50] ). The theory of belief functions has a rigorous mathematical foundation based on a relaxation of the additivity axiom of probability theory. The resulting Dempster-Shafer language provides explicit tools for dealing with ambiguity and "uncommitted belief." There has recently been a surge of interest in the Dempster-Shafer language within the A1 community, and a considerable number of expert systems and expert system shells already employ this technique (e.g., Baldwin and Monk [3] condusion that ehe certainty factors language and the ad hoc Bayesian language used in Prospector induce isomorphic sets of degrees of belief. This isomorphism, however, was based on nonprobabilistic algebraic mappings. In this paper we take a different approach, as follows.
The paper commences with a review of rule-based inference, the context in which belief languages are used in artificial intelligence. A Bayesian language is then presented, and its underlying (extraprobabilistic) rationality is demonstrated. This is done to motivate our choice of the Bayesian language, as opposed to another desiredata (e.g., Hajek's), as a standard against which other belief languages will be compared. We then present an analytic methodology, which, lacking a better name, is termed dialectal analysis. This set of tools, designed to investigate the kinship to two or more belief language, is then used to describe the implicit relationships among the certainty The two major building blocks of an expert system are the knowledge base and the inference engine. The knowledge-buse is conceptually a directed graph consisting of propositional nodes and inferential arcs. The boundary of the graph consists of a set of competing hypotheses (e.g., diseases in a medical diagnosis application) and a set of observable cfuaq (e-g, diagnostic symptoms). Inner nodes represent subgptheses (e.g., clinical syndromes). The directed arc connecting nodes e and h represents a direct inferential relationship between e and h, and the arc's label is the strength of this relationship, or the degree of belief, be1 (h, e).2
The inference engine is a search algorithm that prunes this evidential network and applies modus ponens repetitively. One difference between this and standard theorem proving stems from the uncertainty associated with rules: as the inference engine prunes rules that ultimately imply a hypothesis, a belief calculus is applied to update the posterior belief in this hypothesis. This noncategorical reasoning process terminates when the belief in one or more hypotheses exceeds a certain predefined cutoff value. At least in theory, this value should be based on the cost of gatheririg additional evidence and on the consequences of committing type I and I1 errors.
The preceding paragraph emphasizes the central role that belief calculi play in noncategorical rule-based inferearn. A m r b g to Shafer and Tversky [51] , the building blacks of a belief language are syntax, calculus, and semantics. In the context of this paper, we define syntax to be the set of all degrees of belief that are relevant to a particular 21pt;hesis R. Typically, a set of atomic degrees of belief bel(h, {e,)); --, bel (h, (e,3) is elicited directly from a human expert, while compound degrees of belief are computed ad hoc through a set of operators collectively known as a belief calculus.
A completely specified rule-based belief calculus must consist of five combination functions: parellel combinatioxi (combining the degrees of belief rendered by two or more independent rules), sequential combination (combining the rule's degeree of belief with the uncertainty associated with the rule's antecedent), and three logical combination functions (for negations, &junctions and conjunctions of uncertain pieces of evidence). In this paper we focus on parallel combination only.
With regard to semantics, we take the position that the semantics of a particular belief language is given in terms factors, contrast/inertia, and ~e m~s t e r -~h a f e r languages. Each of these languages is discussed in a separate section 'From now on, the notation bel(h,e) is shorthand for bel(h,(e)). 
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of a mapping from the syntax and calculus dimensions of the language onto the theory of subjective probability. To the extent that the latter theory is taken to be a norm for rationality, this mapping provides normative validity to the syntax and calculus dimensions of the belief langauge in question.
It is reasonable to assume that any rule-based belief calculus with be founded on some parameterized variant of the following model:
The single-place degree of belief bel(h), which is a shorthand of W ( h , ?B) Focusing on some intuitive properties of belief-update, we might require that belbe commutative, i.e., and associative, i.e.,
These properties are quite plausible on rational grounds; we wouldn't like a physician to change his diagnosis simply because the order by which information is presented to him is altered. In general, one is free to construct an axiomatic desiderata regarding the intuitive properties of bel, using it further to evaluate formal belief languages. Such an approach was undertaken by Cox [12] , Savage 1471, Popper [#I, and, most recently, Horvitz et al, [27] . For example, Cox ent~rnerated seven intuitive properties of belief-update and proceeded to prove that the resulting belfunction is a probability. By augmenting Cox's framework with three additional intuitive properties, Horvitz et al. have shown that any belief-update measure that satisfies the extended fr~mework must be equal to some monotonic transformation of a likelihood-ratio. Note that the belief-update model (1) is neither "good" in any philosophical sense, nor does it reflect any plausible desiderata. At the same time, the general form of (1) is largely dictated by the rule-based architecture, which assumes that a) wholistic expert knowledge can be decomposed into a finite series of discrete observations (rules), d b) fbag. subsets of this %nowledge-base can be synthesized or "rolled back" ints posterior beliefs. Suppose that we accept a) and b) as reasonable restrictions on the subset on inference problems to be studied. Can we define this subset more precisely? is it true that different belief languages are capable of modeling different subsets of inference problems? These questions will be addressed in what fsltows.
The term inference problem introduced in the last paragraph refers to an ordered set of propositions, say (h, el,-. -, en), in which h and {el; . -, en} are interpreted -as a hypothesis and relevant body of evidence, respectively. Given this terminology, the "solution" of an inference problem refers to the correct Bayesian computation of the posterior belief in h in light of {el,. -. , en ). From a probabilistic standpoint, { h, el,. --, en) is viewed as a space of dichotsmous random variables, characterized by a joint distribution function P: W -, [O, 11 where W is the set of 2"+1 b d w pernutations defied over the space. Under this Bayesian interpretation, the ultimate goal of the inference process is to wmpute the posterior probability P(h)el,. -.,en). It is easy to see, however, that any bruteforce attempt to compute this conditional probability from the joint distribution function P(h, el; . -, en) is bound to be exponential in n.
The preceding paragraph assumes that P is known. In reality, this is clearly not the case. For example, the inference problem (h, el,. -, en)' might represent the inferential relationships that exist between, say, a hidden oil deposit h and its geological manifestations {el,--. , en).
Clearly, complete knowledge of the joint distribution function P(*) will rarely be credibly available and P(.) will have to be generated piecemeal using partial data and subjective expert judgment. At the same time, the elusive P might serve as a mechanism for defining classes of inference problems which vary in terms of their computational complexity. This is motivated by the notion that the cognitive complexity of an inference problem has something to do with the mathematical modularity of its underlying P. With that in mind, the following P characterization of inference problems is of special interest, as will be seen
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shortly: Ratio-Form Conditionally Independent Problems: An inference problem (h, el;. ., en) is said to be ratio-form conditionally independent (Grosof (231) if
Many writers have haphazardly read (3) to imply that 5,; . ., en are conditionally independent given both h and h.3 Clearly, (3) reflects a weaker notion of modularity which is neeessaq but not sufficient for the latter assertion.
We now turn to describe a we11-horn version of the Bayesian language that is limited to ratio-form conditionally independent problems. This language is used as a standard against which other belief languages will be compared. This strategy (as opposed to formulating a desiredata) is based on the premise that the Bayesian beliefupdate model has extraprob tena~& of rationality that cannot be debated by a reasonable person. We b p e that the following section will help to convince skeptical readers that this is indeed true.
Before delving into this discussion, we take the liberty of confining the analysis to inference problems (h, {el,e2}) consisting of one hypothesis and two pieces of evidence. All the findings reported here can be easily extended to any finite number of pieces of evidence, as long as they are all directly connected to the single hypoahesis in question. Degrees of belief in the ratio-form Bayesian language are expressed in terms of odds and likelihood ratios: the posterior belief in a hypothesis h in light of E = {el, e,) is the odds bel(h, E ) = P (~~E ) / P ( & I E ) , P being a standard subjective probability. The degree of belief in the causal rule (if h then e) is represented through the conditional likelihood ratio ~(elh)/P(el&). With that in mind, the Bayesian calculus is viewed as a mechanism designed to synthesize a set of causal degrees of belief into a combined posterior belief, The remainder of this section presents the derivation of this calculus. Similar derivations were carried out in numerous papers in decision theory and in AI, e.g., Peirce [42] , Edwards et al. 1171, and Charniak [8] .
A. Derivation of the Bayesian Calculus
We begin with Bayes rule, applied to both P(hlel,e2) and p(&le1, e,):
Dividing (4) by (5) gives the odds-ratio version of Bayes rule:
Now, if the problem (h, el, e,) is ratio-form conditionally independent, (Grosof, [23]) (6) reduces to the following definition of the Bayesian calcdw:
or, using a simplified notation,
lh).L(e,lh).R(h).
(7)
The e~n a t i o n of the joint distribution of evidence P(e,, e,) in the step from (4) and (5) to (6) has important practical implications First, the elicitation of any joint distribution function is a painstaking undertaking which should be avoided whenever possible. Second, (6) is completefy independent of the degree of uncertainty associated with the evidence E = {el, e,): if a clue e is uncertain, i.e., P(e) (1, this uncertainty is as relevant to h as it is to %, and therefore it can be canceled out. Finally, the elimination of P(el,e2) gives the knowledge engineer a wide choice of elicitation techniques, as any one of the following measures might be used to parameterize the evidential support that e renders to h: the pair of probabilities (P{e]h), ~( e ) % ) ) , the likelihood ratio ~( e l h ) /~( e P ) ,
The latter two expressions are equivalent, and any one of them can be derived from the former. This variety is important, as different applications and different experts might prefer one elicitation method over the other. We now turn to discuss some nonmathematical properties of rationality that are consistent with the Bayesian calculus (Cl).
B. On the Underlying Rationality of the Bayesian Language
The subjective4 school of probability (e.g., Ramsey [46] ) is based on the argument that the semantic interpretation of probability can be given in terms of rational human judgment under uncertainty. Proponents of this school of thought argued vigorously and quite convincingly that any 3 hereafter denotes "not h."
'~lso referred to as Bayesian or personal school of probability (e.g., Rarnsey [46D.
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other interpretation of probability is merely a special case of the subjective philosophy (de Finetti 1131). As Savage [47, p. 671 puts it, "the personalistic view incorporates all the universally acceptable criteria for reasonableness in judgment known to me.. . when any criteria that may have been overlooked are brought forward, they will be welcomed into the personalistic view." Following Savages's line of thought, we wish to show that, given some plausible interpretations, important "dialects" of new belief languages are indeed special cases of the classical Bayesian language. The latter language is considered a gold standard because, normatively speaking, it is consistent with many intuitive principles of rational of these principles, which are all consistent with (CP), are discussed Mow, In wbaf f d o m , a human (or mechanized) agent who behaves in accordance with (Cl) is called a Bayesian judge. A human agent who entertains an abstract belief-update &el which may or may not be related to (CZ) Is called a b a n judge.
Proper Synthesis of Degrees of Beliefi The tendency of human judges to underweight or ignore base-rate information is a well-known manifestation of the representativeness bias (Tversky and Kahneman 1571). For example, consider a candidate for a junior faculty position who already has several major publications under his belt. We argue W the fact that the candidate is a prolific W n : m ( e ) might cause a human judge to overestimate Bis future tenure prospects (h). This overoptimism occurs either by misinterpreting ~( e ] h ) /~( e l & ) to be ~( h l e ) /~( h l e ) , or by letting a high and salient diagnostic impact ~( e l h ) /~( e l & ) to overshadow the "dull" background information that only, say, 20 percent of aeW recruits are ultimately promoted to tenure. This bias will not distract a Bayesian yudge who adhere? to (Cl), where the base-rate information P(h)/P(h) is explicitly represented and carries tbie same weight as P( e 1 h ) /~( e 1 h ). Furehemore, (Cl) L both comutawve and associative, meaning that the evidential impact of clues is independent of order and clustering effects. This is in sharp contrast to human judgment that is prone to such belief synthesis biases as primacy effect (Anderson [2] ) recency effect (Lopes [35] ), misinterpretation of new evidence (Nisbett and Ross [37]), conservatism (Edwards [16] ), and a host of other "averaging" rules that violate (Cl) (Slovic and Lichtenstein [54] ).
Fusion of Quantitative and Qualitative Euidence: The formation of a posterior belief in an uncertain hypothesis typically requires a joint consideration of factual information as well as subjective opinions. For example, consider the two propositions proiific researcher el and good teacher (e,). A Bayesian inference system that evaluates tmure prospects (h) will have lo use, among other things, the probabilities P(e,Jh ) and P(e2jh). Where do these numbers come from? The probability that a tenured professor is a prolific researcher can be obtained in a frequentist fashion, counting the number of prolific researchers among a known sample of tenured professors. Teaching ability ma) be a more elusive property, and the probability I P(e21h) can be elicited as a "personal" degree of belief, using a domain expert. According to the subjective school of probability, the scope of rational values that the frequentist P(ellh) and the subjective P(e21h) may attain is constrained by the same set of axioms. Due to this uniformity, the Bayesian language provides a homogeneous framework in which stochastic and epistemic degrees of belief are combined through the same calculus.
Equal Attention to Positive and Negative Euidence: Human judges who are left to their own devices are known consistently to seek and overweigh supportive evidence at the expense of neglecting or underestimating negative clues (Koriat et al. [30] ). At the same time, a knowledge engineer who is guided by (Cl) is forced to discount supportive belief of the form P(e1h) with its negative complementary belief ~{ e j & ) . Fw example, the impact of a good record of publications (e) on tenure prospects (h) is automatically discourired by the observation that good research is also produced by ommured candidates (~( e l x ) > 0). In other words, (Cl) forces the Bayesian judge to "dilute" his belief P(elh) with the complementary belief ~( e l h ) ; said otherwise, if (Cl) is transformed into a log-linear scoring formula, both P(e1h) and ~( e l z )
will have the same (unit) "coefficient of importance" in the resulting model. Cognitive &stor~om of the "dilution effect" were discussed by Nisktt et al. i381.
The More Information, the Better: A close examination of (Cl) reveals that the Bayesian calculus is consistent with the commonly held principle that data (pieces of evidence) should never be thrown away. More precisely, Savage [47, p. 481 has shown that for n sufficiently large, the probability, given that h is true, that the likelihood-ratios product L(e,(h).; a , .L(e,lh) (as in (7)) is greater than any preassigned a m b e r is almost one, i.e., for 0 < c < ao, barring two banal exceptions. Our interpretation of this beautiful theorem is that the Bayesian judge becomes wiser as he goes along in his judicious search for relevant information: as more and more balanced and nonredundant evidence is brought to bear, the posterior belief in any hypothesis approaches certainty (through (Cl)), provided that this hypothesis is indeed true. It is trivial to show that this holds for any nonzero prior belief in the hypothesis; in that respect, the theorem also confirms that a rational person is a pragmatic learner. Regardless of how little belief s/he initially holds in an unpopular truth, e.g, that jogging is bad for one's health, s/he is willing to change that opinion freely as new information becomes available.
Explicit Treatment of Conditional Independence: The Bayesian language offers a rich variety of tools for detecting, representing, and dealing with correlated evidence. For example, it is easy to show that any one of the following three assertions implies the other two: 1) P(ellh, e2) = P(e,lh); 2) P(e21h, el) = P(e21h): 3) P(el,e21h) = P(e,lh).P(e21h). The equivalence of 1) and 2) implies that the assertion "given h, knowing el does not change my belief in e," is symmetric with respect to el and e, as we would have expected. The equivalence of 1) and 3) implies that either 1) or 2) is consistent with the classical definition of statistical independence. Note, however, that either 1) or 2) is preferred to 3) from a cognitive standpoint: each conveys a better understanding of the notion of independence, and together they offer two cognitively different but mathematically equivalent techniques to elicit the same phenomenon. Hence Bayesian knowledge engineers who seek to detect correlated evidence might use 1 ) and 2) either separately or in tandem. This provides a richer language for knowledge acquisition and a simple means for cross-vcerification of human inputs.
In the event that some piem of evidence are correlated (with respect to either h or to 6), (Cl) becomes invalid on normative grounds. Several authors, e.g., Charniak [8] and Pearl [40] , pr heuristic te@&ques to correlated inference networks into equivalent (but not identical) networks in which some vwsdon of (C1) might be applied. As this line of research is quite new, these techniques are somewhat limited. At the same time, statistical dependency is a prevailing feature of nature that cannot be swept under the rug. It is therefore fortunate that the Bayesian language provides a powerful arsenal of tools for expressing &is phenomenon and dealing with it explicitly.
Compatibility with Decision T k 0 9 : Aside from its compliance with rational judgment, the Bayesian language is syntactically compatible with many models that may be used in the context of expert systems. For example, Raiffa's [45] value-of-information analysis attempts to pursue the "most valuable" clue, i-e., the clue with the (anticipated) maximal diagnostic h p x t on current belief. In a similar vein, LangEstz el a!. f321 pow& a daision bhwretic extension to rule-based reasoning, in which utility eonsiderations serve to evaluate the merit of potential search paths in a rule-based inference net. There exist numerous other areas in which A1 and decision theory might benefit greatly from each other. To reap such benefits, though, both disciplines have to speak in the m e language. In this regard it is worth noting that practically a11 the work in prescriptive decision theory is. already cast in terms of the Bayesian language. Hence this language would be a pragmatic starting point for a comparative analysis.
In summary, perhaps the reader is by now convinced that (Cl) has more to it than at first appears. From a technical standpoint, Bayes rule is a trivial exercise in set theory, given the axioms of subjective probability. These axioms, however, can be nontrivially derived from rational behavior under uncertainty (Cox [12] , de Finetti [13], Savage [47]). Thus the epistemological interpretation of Bayes rule and its implications on judgment, learning, and experience. This dichotomy is clearly a manifestation of the Janus face of probability: "on the one side it is statistical, concerning itself with stochastic laws of chance processes. On the other side it is epistemological, dedicated to assessing degrees of belief in propositions quite devoid of statistical background" (Hacking [24, p. 121) .
We conclude this section with a formal definition of the (ratio-form conditionally independent) Bayesian language, which plays a central role in what follows.
I
Definition I : Let LBayes be the belief language whose syntax consists of likelihood ratios of the form P(elh)/ ~( e l h ) and whose calculus is (Cl).
Thus we focus on an inference context in which causal rules of the form h -, e are parameterized by likelihood ratios of the form el h)/~(elg). Furthermore, we assume that these degrees of belief are combined through Bayes rule (Cl). Since (Cl) is restricted to ratio-form conditionally independent inference problems, L, , , , is a special case of a more general Bayesian language. To avoid clutter, though, we will refer below to LBaye, as the Bayesian lmguage. We will comment later on the restrictiveness of this language.
N.
CTAL ANALYSIS
I
The previous section was meant to serve as a motivation for adopting the Bayesian language LBayes as a standard against which other belief languages will be judged. This analysis will be carried out within a methodological framework described in this section. The following terminology b used throughout: let L, = (bel,, C,), i E {1,2), be two belief language. bel, denotes the syntax (set of degrees of belief) of Li, and Cj. denotes the L, calculus, i.e., an operator C, : bel, -, bel, defined over and into the L, degrees of belief.
Definition 2: If the syntax of L, is identical to the syntax of L2 and the calculus of L, is a special case of the calculus of L,, L, is said to be a dialect of L,.
Definition 3: Let T be a mapping T: bell -+ bel,. If T(be1,) = bet, implies that C,(T(bel,)) = Cl(bell), then we say that L, is isomorphic to L, under T and denote it is4 4, L,),. 
1) iso (L,, L,) where I is the identity mapping I(be1,)
= bell 2) if iso (L,, L,) ,, and iso ( L , , L3),, then isO(Ll, L3)72eT1 3) if T-' exists uniquely then iso (L,, L,) 
, if and only if iso (L,, L 1 ) T -~
Definitions 2-4 and Corollary 1 provide a general framework for investigating implicit relationships between two or more belief languages. Given two languages L, and L,, the basic idea is to try to give L2 a meaning T using thq S -W -~~~C S of rdl. If an isomorphism emerges and, furthermore, the meaning T "makes sense," we argue that L, is a special or a "disguised" case of L,. This exercise is carried out as follows: first, one inspects the degrees of belief of L, and tries to define them in terms of the Ll syntax using some function T: bell + be],. In the next stage, one carries out this very interpretation throughout L,'s calculus C,, replacing every occurrence of {bel,) in the definition of C, with its corresponding degree of belief (T(be1,) ). The objectiw.: here is to obtain a mathematical expression which has a calculus-cal meaning within L,. Ideally, this expression can be shown to be equivalent to the L, calculus, in which case L, is said to be isomorphic to L, under the interpretation T. Multilingual relationships may be established thrmgb Corollary 7.
This technique is used extensively in tfie next three sections to investigate the kinship of the &3tsian, the certainty factors, the contrast/inertia, and the DempsterShafer languages.
(jointly referred to as CF's) is elicited directly from a domain expert. The combined, net increased belief in h in light of E = {el,e2} is computed through the following calculus :
'MB (hie,)+ ~B ( h l e , ) . An inspection of (C2) reveals that the CF calculus is commutative and associative. Hence (C2) might be applied recursively to compute the compound evidential impact of any finitk set of clues {e1;..,e,), using an adjustment and anchoring model simiIar to (2). Note also that both The certainty factors (CF) Impage was conceived and tC2a) and (~2 b ) appear to convey an (additive) rational implemented as part of the seminal Mycin project, an sense: if yon open the parentheses of either (C2a) or (C2b), AI-based medical diagnosis system developed by Shortliffe you obtain the sum 01 CF(hlel) and CF(h(e,) minus some 1531 and his colleagues at Stanford University. Following sort of a multiplicative interaction effect: the subsequent popularity of the general-purpose Emycin (Van Melle 1581) and the M.1 rule-based architectures, the CFfhIe,,e,) = CF(hle,)+CF (hIe,) k~ languagd became the de jacto belief language of most -CF(hlel).CF(hle,).
(8) applied expert systems in a survey conducted by Harmon and King [39] , seven of t&e eight expert system "&ells9' that supported uncertainty management were based on the CF model. Over the past few years, these development tools have generated numerous expert systems, and many of these are thus based on some version of the CF language.
The developmar of the C F language as an alternative to Bayesian inference was originally justifiedt on mrmative as uell as on practical grounds. From a philosophid standpoint, the certainty factor CF(hje) is rewiniscent of Carnap's [7] confirmation function C(h,e), designed to measure the degree of 1ogicaI entailment associated with the inexact implication e + h. In the rule-based architecture, CF's are used to parameterize diagnostic rules of the form (IF e THEN h), This type of forward reasoning (i.e., from effects to causes) is widely practiced by knowledge engineers and developers of existing expert systems.
Unlike the Bayesian language, the CF calculus operates on relative rather than absolute degrees of belief. It is assumed that, most of the time, there exist several pieces of evidence that increase and decrease one's belief in a hypothesis simultaneously. In the additive CF syntax, MB(h le) ( MD( h le)) represents the increased belief (disbelien in the hypothesis h rendered by the e, with 0 9 MB. MD 91 and MB. MD = 0. If e is irrelevant to h, AIB(h1e) = MD(h1e) = 0. The extreme case of e being sufficiently convincing to confirm (disconfirm) h in certainty is modeled through MB = 1 and MD = 0 (MB = 0 and MD = 1). Normally, a set of atomic MB's and MD's Now contrast this with the following logarithmic transformation of the Bayesian calculus (7): l o g~( h \ e , , e,)-log R ( h ) = log ~( e , ( h ) +log ~( e , ( h ) .
We see that the diagnostic C F combination rule (8) is remarkably similar to its Bayesian causal counterpart (9). (e,, e,) is defined as the (possibly d belief in h due to {el, e2), which is precisely what we find on the left side of (9). Second, the right sides of (8) and (9) are also similar, excluding the presence of CF(hle,).CF(hle,) in the latter. This "interaction factor" can be viewed as and ad hoc compensation for double-counting correlated evidence in the CF calculus. Given this rationale, the absence of an interaction effect in L, , , , makes sense, as L, , , , is explicitly confined to ratio-form conditionally independent inference problems which are free of interaction effects. This observation might lead to the deceptive impression that the CF language accounts for interaction effects while L,,,,, does not, and consequently, that the CF language is less restricted than the Bayesian language. As will be discussed shortly, this impression is false.
First, reed that CF(ir
The similarity of the CF and the Bayesian languages is also reflected in their treatment of the state of insufficient reason (Savage 1471). In the CF language, a hypothesis h which is backed by no clues is assigned a "prior" certainty factor of zero, i.e., C F (~( 0 ) = 0. When a clue e becomes available, the posterior belief in h undergoes a trivial 
e l ( h l e ) =~+~~( h l~) -~'~~(~l~) =~~(~l~) .
(lo) these numbers must be zero. If E is a diverse body of
In the classical Bayesian language (and following Laplace), the lack of any prior evidence on h may be modeled by assigning equal odds on h and on h, yielding P(h)/P(h) = 1.' Hence the Bayesian counterpart of (10) is Consequently, we see that both languages have an isomorphic interpretation of the state of insufficient reason: the neutral degree of belief in the additive CF language is zero, while its counterpart in the multiplicative odds-ratio Bayesian language is ow. The exact nature of this isomorphism will become clearer in the next ses.tion.
For a detailed description of the CF language, the reader is referred to Buchanan and Shortliffe [6] . In the present paper we restrict our attention to a dialect of this language, defined as follows.
Definirion 5 : Let LC, be the Ianguage whose syntax consists of pairs ( M B , MD) and whose calculus colasists of (C2a) and (C2b). In what faBows, LcF is somefiaBes referred to as the two-valued CF language.
evidence, both numbers may be strictly positive. ~efined that way, LC, allows us to simultaneously track the impact of negative and positive evidence on each hypothesis.
A. Bayesian Interpretation to the CF Language
There have been several attempts to justify the CF syntax on Bayesian grounds. The formulae given below were originally proposed by Shortliffe [53] as an ex-post Bayesian interpretation of certainty factors. This widely quoted mapping is defined as follows:
We see &a? the major difference between the commonly = ( min (P(hle), P ( h ) ) -P ( h ) , otherwise. used C F language and LcF is the exclusion of the combination rule for mixed evidence (C2c) in the latter. Equa--P ( h ) tion (C2c) was added ad hoc to the CF language to (Tlb) improve the computational efficiency of Mycin (Van Melle [58j) and is of little interest here. In fact, it is easy to create examples in which (C2c) does not make sense. To illustrate, consider Sue Ellen and Cliff, who were two suspects in shooting J. R, Assume that Sue EIlen and Cliff sstmd in line to inherit $900000 a d 3808000, respectively, from J. R.'s estate. We represent this information (quite crudely) by assigning MB(Sue Ellen) = 0.8 and MB(Cliff) = 0.9, where MB(x) is the degree of support in the hypothesis "x shot J. R." Now, suppose that we further learn that J. R had owed Cliff $500000, and that this loan was to be terminated upon J. R.'s death. This new piece of evidence must decrease our suspicion in Cliff, and we therefore assign MD(C1iff) = 0.5. It turns out, however, that according to ( C~C ) , the pooled evidence suggests that Sue Ellen and Cliff are equal suspects, with ~~(~u e :~l l e n ) = CF(Cliff) = 0.8.
This example is admittedly crude, bllt it does demonstrate that (C2c) is a problematic evidence-pooling operator. We thus prefer to focus on a "simpler" language LC,, in which the belief in any proposition h in the face of mixed evidence E (consisting of positive and negative pieces of evidence) is represented by a pair of numbers CF(h(E) = (MB(h/E), MD(h1E)) describing a) the inUnder the (TI) mapping, the C F o l d u s (C2) is viewed as a belief calculus that operaits on normalized differences in probabilities rather than on absolute probabilities. For example, P l a ) represents the increased belief in h in light of e as a normalized difference between the posterior P(hie) and the prior P(h), P taken to be a probability.
Before proceeding with dialectal analysis, we first have to clean up (TI) to make it a well-defined mapping from L,,,, to the two-valued LC,. This mapping ought to map Bayesian likebod-ratios of the form ~( e { h ) /~( e [ h ) on pairs of numbers CF(hfe) = (MB(hle), MD(hle)), one of which must be zero (a single piece of evidence e cannot support and negate h simultaneously). We thus fix (TI) as follows:
his equal spread of belief in the face of insufficient reason was (T2) be parameterized by the Bayesian prior belief P(h). It is therefore appropriate to denote the mapping as follows:
Lemma 2: The Bayesian interpretation (T2) transforms P ( elh) the MB-combination rule (C2a) into the following Bayesian
MD(hle)). (12) belief-update model:
It is easy to show that (TI) and (T2) are equivalent, excluding the cases of P ( h ) = 0 and P(h) = 1 which are . * r undefined in the latter. This can be easily added to (T2), but we leave it out to avoid clutter. Also, for the sake of Proof: It is easy to verify that the Bayesian interpretabrevity, when we refer to (T2) from now on, we will only tion (T2) implies that MB(h1e) = -~~( z l e ) .
This fact, discuss the positive part of the pair (MB, M a > . Thus together with Lemma 1, completes the proof.
will be technically referred to as a single-valued mapping, Theorem I: LC-is isomorphic to LBayei under the remembering that the second value of its image is always Bayesian interpretation (T2). zero.
Pro08 From Lemmas 1 and 2, (T2) maps the CF 3. Implications calculus on the joint application of (13) and (14). By dividing the former by the latter, the Bayesian calculus In his probabilistic analysis of certainty factors was (C1) emerges. Hence LcF is isomorphic to L,,, under camed out by Adams [I] , has shown rhat the CF calculus In). Heckerman proposed a revised interpretation of certainty rather, humans tend to discount the impact of negative factors. He then went on to show that the revised interpreevidence and inflate the impact of supportive evidence.
tation implies that the CF language is equivalent to an These assumptions are consistent with the previous experiodds-ratio version of the Bayesian language. mental work in cognitive psychology, e.g., Snyder and In this paper we stick to the original interpretation of Swann 1551. In the CI syntax, Sk stands for the posterior certainty factors (TI) or, more precisely, (n), and proceed belief in a certain hypothesis after k pieces of evidence to show that, under this mapping, LC, is isomorphic to have been brought to bear. As additional clues become L,,,,,. The following lemmas are largely equivalent to available, this degree of belief is modified through an Adams' analysis which was rather informal. We feel order-sensitive anchoring and adjustment process.
1 that recasting these in the f r a e w~r k of dialect4
Suppose that at step k -1, one holds a belief Sk-, in a analysis serves to clarify the implicit relationship between hypothesis h. At step k a new clue relevant to h is brought LC, and L,,,,,. For the sake of brevity, ody the m~e s to b m . A clue which decreases (increases) the belief in h of the proofs are given. is called negative (positive) evidence and denoted a, (b,). Given this nomenclature, the contrast/inertia calculus is Lemma 1: The Bayesian interpretation (T2) transforms defined as the MD-combination rule (C2b) into the following Baqesian belief-update model:
Proof (Adams [I] ): Recall that the MD-combination rule (C2b) is designed to combine two negative pieces of evidence. H e m afre third line of (T2) is used to transform the MD's in (C2b) into their corresponding Bayesian '6 .
images." For example, MD(hle,) is transformed into (P(hle,)-P(h))/-P(h). The proof proceeds by carrying out this transformation throughout the left side and the right side of (C2b) which, after several algebraic manipulations, becomes Bayes rule (4) for computing the posterior belief in h in light of the ratio-form conditional independent e~idence (e,, e,). (15) and (16) are called discounting and accretion models, respectively. Taken together, (15) and (16) is a sequential anchoring-and-adjustment calculus that can be parameterized to reflect various behavioral assumptions. In particular, the following parameters need to be specified: wk adjustment factor for negative evidence at step k , 'k adjustment factor for positive evidence at step k, gl(a,) subjective evaluation of the kth negative clue, g2(bk) subjective evaluation of the kth positive clue.
Einhorn and Hogarth made the following assumptions: wk = a . Sk -and rk = P . (1 -Sk -,) . Their rationale is as follows: a and , l 3 are constants of proportionality, measuring one's sensitivity to new evidence or, alternatively, one's propensity to change current opinions. This propensity is also influenced dynamically by the current belief Sk-, or the anchor, as follows: negative evidence is discounted more when the current belief is large, whereas positive evidence is inflated when the current belief is small. Einhorn and Hogarth also specified the functions gl(ak) andg2(bk), but it turns out that this level of detail is unnecessary for our analysis, so we ignore it fpr the sake of generality. Thus we will focus on the following belief-update model:
Definition 6: Let I,, be the language whose syntax consists of (g,(ak), g2(bk)) and whose calculus consists of (C3)-
A. Bayesian Interpretation of the CI Language
Before presenting of the Bayesian interpretation of LC,, it is appropriate to step back and reflect on the nature of this analysis. It is important to remember that the whole purpose of the descriptive CI I m~g e is to account for systematic violations of the Bayesian belief-update model. It thus seems circular to map L, , , on LC,. At the same time, this exercise is important because it puts the finger precisely on where the former stops and where the latter takes over. It thus shows explicitly in what ways the CI language extends the Bayesian limguage.
The Bayesian interpretation of the @I: language will be derived indirectly. Fmt, we give a plausible interpretation which grants an isomorphism between the CL and the CF languages. We then use the transitivity part of Corollary 1, combined with the Bayesian interpretation of the CF language, to derive a (compound) Bayesian interpretation for the CI language.
Assume that at stage k -1 one holds a prior belief Sk-, in a hypothesis h and that a new clue ek-l becomes available, carrying a negative evidential impact a,-,. After the belief Sk -, is updated to Sk-,, a new negative clue ek becomes available, carrying a negative impact a,, and the final belief Sk is established. Now consider the following mapping: The justification of the mapping (T3) is as follows: negative and postive impacts in the CF language map precisely on their subjective perceptions in the CI language. Compound C F impacts map on normalized net increases in belief in the C1 language. Interestingly, it can be shown that the mapping (T3), along with the alternative, Bayesian interpretation of the CI syntax Sk-, = P(h) and Sk = P(hjek), jointly impIy the Bayesian interpretation s f c e r~a b~y factors (T2) discussed in the previous section. This curious relationship will become clearer in tSae find discussion section,
We now prewed to show that the mapping (T3) : LC, -, LC, is an isomorphism between the two-valued CF language and LC,.
B. Implications
Lemma 3: The mapping (T3a) transforms the MD-combination rule for negative evidence (C2b) into the CI-discounting rule (C3a) with a = 1.
Prwf..
g out the mapping (T3a) through the MD-combination rule (C2b) gives which is equivalent (after several algebraic manipulations) ! to which, in turn, is equivalent to and it is easy to show that (19) is the compound impact of a two-staged contrast/inertia accretion model (with a = 1)
Lemma 4: The mapping (T3b) transforms the MB-combination rule (C2a) into the CI accretion rule (C3b) with / 3 =l.
Proof: the proof is similar to that of Lemma 3, and we leave it as an exercise for the reader. Returning to the (T3) mapping, we note that by fixing Consider the set of propositions 8. A function be1 : 2' -, the prior belief parameter Sk-, the mapping can be in- [O,1] Given an exhaustive set of mutui4dly excEusive propositions ("frame of g&.~emment'? 9, Shafer defines a belief function that assigns degrees of befief to ewery element in the power set 2' , extending the notion of probability which is deflned over 8 only. Two or more belief functions be],. be], : 2' -, [@,I] may be combined through Dempster's rule. yielding a compound belief function @el,@ bel,) : 2@ --, [O. 11. Unlike pmhbiities, belief functions are subadditive. That is, the definition of a belief function is consistent R ith the property bc:1(h)+bel[%) d 1, and the quantity 1 -be1 (h) -be](%) is defined qliciidy as the degree of or unconmmitted belief associated with the proposition h. Note that although Shafer describes belief as a singleplace function bel(h), he really means this to be a shorthand notation for bel(hlE), E being a relevant body of evidence (which may be empty). We will adopt this abbreviated notation as welL6
The Dempster-Sbafer {DS) language is well-suited for nondetermlnistic expert system for 8 rmumber of reasons. Accordlnp to Shafer 1491, the themy lends itself n i d y to inferential problems in which the prior probabilities of hypotheseq are unavailable. Second, Shafer proposed that the predirnre nature of the degree of belief be1 (h le) is often more intuitively appealing than its causal counterpart P(eih). which is used in most Bayesian inference s!sterns. Third, Dempster's rule is viewed by many practitioners as a belief calculus that operates on belief intervals rather than on point probabilities (Spiegelhalter [56] ). Indeed. Shafer has shown that his degree of belief bel(h) Conesponds to a belief interval [bel(h), P*(h)] where * ' ( A ) = 1 -beg(&) is the upper probability of h, and, funhermore. if be1 = P* then be1 is a probability. Hence 'he DS language is viewed as a mechanism that enables an s!'stem to represent, combine, and propagate interpoint. and uncommitted beliefs in hypotheses.
Simple support functions consist of a special case of belief functions (Shafer [50] ). A simple support function be1 is focused only on one element in the frame of discernment. That is, be1 awards a positive degree of belief to one elemem in the frame and zero belief to any other element. belief funcl;ions might be combined through Dempster's rule, which is commutative and associative. If there are more then two belief functions, the rule can be applied repetitively. Hence we can resort once again to the simple inference problem (h, el, e,) , knowing that the analysis can be extended to any finite n > 2. We model this inference problem by two simple support functions defined over f h, 8) and focused on h. Now, in general, Dempster's rule for combining belief functions is quite complex; however, in the case of two (and, in fact, n) simple support functions and a dichotomous frame of discernment, Dempster's rule reduces to, for every x E 2(h3h), and it is easy to show that the resulting be1 is a simple support function defined over {h, $1 and focused on h.
Definition 7: Let LDS be the belief language whose syntax consists of simple support functions and whose calculus consists of Dempster's rule (C4). LDS will be sometimes referred to as the simple DS language.
We conclude this section with the definition of an additive weights of evidence language discussed by Good [21] 7There are other ways to define belief functions. See Shafer [50].
and referred to by Shafer [SO] . The relationship between this language and the present analysis will become clearer shortly.
Definition 8: Let L, be the belief language whose syntax consists of degrees of belief bei(hle,) = w, with w, E [0, a ] and whose calculus consists of the additive combination rule W = wl + . -. + w, , .
A. A Bayesian Interpretation to the i)S Language
Shafer has argued that 1) belief functions are extensions of Bayesian probabilities, and 2) Bayes' rule is a special case of Dempster's rule. Several Bayesian writers have tried to prove preciw1y the opposite. Lindley's [341 line of attack is based on the premise that prob&%ty can replace belief functions by mastipalatkg ahe visaeke design of the problem in question. Kyburg 1311 has shown that a belief function can be represented through a convex set of classical probability functions. He then went on show that the probability intends of the DS Ianguage are a special case of the intervals that result from Bayesian updating on uncertain evidence. Baron [5] has shown that the class of simple support functions can be cast in a Bayesian Ianguage using the notion of ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth [IS] ) such that "ignorance" on h is represented through a second order probability &(P(h)r). Shafer [50] proposed an intuitively appealing interpretation of simple belief functions based on the proximity between LDS and L , . More specifically, Shafer has shown that if a) Dempster rule is taken for granted, and b) weights of evidence combhe additivejy, then the following relationship must exist between the belief function bel: 2* -, [0,1] and the weight of evidence function w: 8 -+ [O, 001: bel =I-eC'".
Since the uni.t of meipsurement fox % b e weights of evidence is arbitrary, Shafer proceeded to set c = -1 to obtain
The Bayesian literature is rife with "weights of evidence" analyses, and Good [20] cites 33 papers on the subject. Turing proposed the following interpretation to the weight of evidence w carried by a clue e to a hypothesis h:
The following section presents a Bayesian interpretation of the simple DS Ianguage that establishes an isomorphism between Dempster's rule and Bayes' rule. This interpretation is a product of two interpretations, (T4) and (T5). The first half of this analysis is due to Shafer, who proposed the linkage (T4) between LDs and L,. We go one step further and observe that LDs is isomorphic not only to L, but also to the Bayesian language LBayes. 
I
Proof: Let bell and bel, be two simple support functions emanating from two evidential sources el and e2 and focused on a hypothesis h. Let w, and w2 be the conesponding weights of evidence carried by el and e, to h. Carrying out the mapping (T4) through Dempster's rule (C4) gives which after several algebraic manipulations, is equivalent 
VIII. DISCUSSION
This paper has given an integrated Bayesian analysis of important dialects of the certainty factors, DempsterShafer, and the contrast/inertia belief languages. Before proceeding any further, we remind the reader that all the findings reported are restricted to the dialects described explicitly in Definitions 5, 6, and 7. These dialects are significant in that they form the nucleus of their corresponding languages. At the same time, one cannot extrapolate the Bayesian interpretations presented into a comprehensive statement about the Bayesian rationality of the overall languages. However, tbese dialects and interpretations provide a good point of d e F u r i : for a complete analysis of the underlying Ianguages. Ha* d e this disclaimer, we may depict the crux o f #he paper symbolically ( Fig. 1 ).
The nodes in Fig what is normally termed the prior belief. For example, given the mapping (T2) : L,,,,, -, LCF, knowledge of the Bayesian prior belief P ( h ) grants the existence of the inverse mapping (T' 2); )
: LCF + LBayer. Some authors have argued that the DS and the CF languages do not require the specification of prior beliefs. We see that this assertion does not hold up under a Bayesian interpretation of these languages. In other words, for these languages to be "rational" on Bayesian grounds, one must be able to specify the prior belief in hypotheses.
The dotted arc in Fig. 1 describes one missing piece in the analysis, namely, the direct relationship betwee-n the certainty factors and the Dempster-Shafer languages. 'This l i i a g e was established by Gordon and Shortliffe [22] , who have shown that the CF calculus is a special case of Dempster's rule. This mapping between LCF and L,, completes the picture, so to speak, leading to two important observations. First, we note that by, virtue of Corollary 1 and Fig. 1 , there exist (compound) plausible mappings that yield isomorphisms between each pair of the languages LCF, LCI, and L,,, and, furthermore, that all these languages are isomorphic to the Bayesian language LBayes. This means that at least on normative Bayesian grounds, these languages a) are equivalent and b) achieve no more than the classical belief language LBayes, which is restricted to ratio-form conditionally independent inference problems. The latter constraint is explicit in LBayes and in the Dempster-Shafer language but is implicit in the CF and in the contrast/inertia languages. This limitation is quite disconcerting, as real-life inference problems are rarely modular.
Moreover, simple assumptions of conditional independence often make belief-update schemes with multiple hypotheses too restrictive to be useful (Johnson [29] ).
Going back to the isomorphism issues, it is intriguing to see that important dialects of different belief languages coming from the quarters of computer science (LCF), psychology (LC.), and statistics (L,,) are all equivalent to a special case of the Bayesian language. This realization might lead to two different reactions. On the one hand, one is tempted to concur with Lindley 1341 that "the only satisfactory description of uncertainty is (Bayesian) probability." On the other hand, there is no doubt that each belief language represents a unique cognitive challenge in terms of knowledge elicitation, and, viewed in this way, their tight normative proximity is in fact reassurance. In other words, different but isomorphic belief Ianguages provide knowledge engineers with a rich variety of tools designed .to represent the same phenomena
With that in mind, future research may proceed in three directicuas. Starling with @he nornative ground, we reiterate the fact that the didects LcF, La and LDs are all special cases of their respective languages. Having shown that these dialects are remarkably Bayesian, future claims that a belief language can accomplish what L,,,,, cannot must be sought within extensions of these dialects. For le, an important normative contribution will be an attempt. to describe and deal with correlated evidence outside the Bayesian language.
Efforts to develop and understand belief languages will be incomplete unless their cognitive or descriptive dimension receives serious attention. This experimental line of research can take two forms. Some researchers, e.g., Mtchell I361 and Schocken [48] , have compared the validity of the recommendations generated by inference systems lhaf were fed with degrees of belief provided by human experts. By keeping the human subjects constant, and varying the belief language "treatments," one can carry out statisticd tests on the external validity of alternative belief languages. A second line of research, e.g. Wise (591 and Yadrick et al. 1601, focuses on similar comparisons which were based on simulated, rather than human-supplied, degrees of belief. The former approach offers better proximity to realistic knowledge engineering settings; the latter enables one to generate worst-case data-sets that are difficult to detect with human subjects. Clearly, the two approaches are equally valid and complement each other.
Finally, a precriptive line of research must emerge. This effort will focus on how findings from normative and cognitive studies may be put to use in practice. This may promote a synthetic approach to knowledge engineering, i.e., one that combines attractive descriptive features of one language with the normative rigor of another.
